Annex G: Force Structure

Overview

Army Force Structure provides the Nation with full spectrum land force capability. Army Transformation is designed to enhance capabilities where resident and gain capability where lacking to meet the tenants of *Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020)*. This dynamic process drives force structure changes and supports the design of forces to meet the Army's full spectrum of missions.

The Army is comprised of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) soldiers and civilians. In FY01, it is organized into four corps, 18 divisions (ten AC and eight Army National Guard (ARNG)), 15 ARNG enhanced Separate Brigades (eSBs), three ARNG strategic brigades and numerous other combat, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units (Figure 1). The Army requires balanced readiness and adequate funding through FY07 for an AC with an end strength of approximately 480,000 soldiers; a RC with an end strength of approximately 555,000 soldiers (350,000 ARNG and 205,000 U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)); and a civilian workforce of approximately 210,000 personnel.

Army Force Structure Initiatives

The Army's Transformation process provides for a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full



Figure 1. FY01 Army Military Force Structure

spectrum of operations in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. The Army will continue to modernize and recapitalize selected Legacy Force elements to retain significant overmatch capability throughout the Transformation process. Simultaneously, the Army will transform an Interim Force of six to eight brigade combat teams that will meet the near-term requirements in support of warfighting Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) by bridging the gap between our light and heavy forces that can operate across the full spectrum of conflict. During this period, the Army will significantly invest in science and technology (S&T) to acquire the Future Combat Systems (FCS), the centerpiece of the future Objective Force capability.

Throughout Transformation, the Army's Legacy Force will maintain a core force that is recapitalized and fielded with new equipment that will increase lethality, situational understanding, and battlefield dominance.

The Interim Force is designed to meet the near-term requirements in support of warfighting CINCs. It is essentially the Army's bridge capability to the Objective Force. The Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) is a fully mobile, air deployable force that normally fights as part of a division in a joint and/or coalition operation, is able to respond rapidly to crises, and operates effectively in peacekeeping or enforcement operations.

The Interim Force will consist of six to eight IBCTs to include a minimum of one ARNG brigade, providing the joint force commander increased operational and tactical versatility to execute fast-paced, distributed, noncontiguous operations.

The Army began the Transformation process in early 2000 at Fort Lewis, Washington, with the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, converting to the IBCT design. The 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division will achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) by June 2003. The second unit to transform, also at Fort Lewis, is the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. It is scheduled to complete conversion by September 2001 with its third infantry battalion undergoing conversion by March 2002. The 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division will reach IOC by June 2004. The IBCTs will receive a family of Interim Armored Vehicles (IAVs) that will provide an enhanced capability to the brigade combat teams.

The Army is developing the organizational and operational concepts for interim organizations at division through corps levels and will refine these concepts as they apply to the Objective Force. The Army's fielding of developing technologies will be fully considered in this process as well as in the following force structure efforts.

The Army Medical Reengineering Initiative is focused on the following operational tenet: provide split-based operational capability; improved tactical mobility; reduced-footprint; fixed communications; advanced information technology; and flexible, deployable, and tailorable units.

The Army National Guard Division Redesign Plan will convert up to 12

maneuver brigades and slice elements from two divisions to combat support and combat service support units by FY11 in order to meet wartime and domestic support requirements.

The Army is programmed to have 132 multicomponent units by FY07. By the end of FY01, the Army will have 36 multi-component units.

The Army established two AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions in October 1999, each consisting of an AC headquarters, commanded by an AC Major General, and three ARNG eSBs.

Introduced in the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army's (CSA's) "One Team, One Fight, One Future" white paper, Army teaming pairs selected AC, ARNG, and USAR units for mutual support of operational requirements.

The Army is conducting a comprehensive reengineering study to review Army Headquarters from corps through major command (MACOM) levels to provide for strategic responsiveness and battle command for the Objective Force.

The Army is conducting a phased transformation for Headquarters, Department of the Army, to gain efficiencies and effectiveness across all functional areas. Functional areas will be streamlined based on capitalizing on information technology.

The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is conducting a reengineering study to review organizational efficiencies in the training base that will provide enhanced training and leader development to support Transformation.

All Army force structure initiatives will be synchronized with the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR may have additional impacts on the Army's force structure and must be closely synchronized with the Transformation Strategy to ensure the Army retains its capability to execute the National Military Strategy (NMS) and to meet Title 10 responsibilities (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Title 10 Responsibilities

Throughout the Transformation process, these principles and goals will guide the Army's force structure initiatives in the program years:

- Increase strategic responsiveness.
- Develop the capability to put a combat force anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff, in brigade combat teams for both stability and support operations and for warfighting. Build that capability into a momentum that generates a warfighting division on the ground in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days.

- Improve operational jointness.
- Develop leaders for joint and coalition warfighting.
- Continue AC/RC integration.
- Man warfighting units first.
- Provide for the well being of soldiers, civilians, and their families.

The Army's ability to support the NMS remains central to determining its force structure requirements as we plan and execute initiatives to transform the Army. The Army intends to leverage information technology and structure a totally integrated force that is sized and shaped to meet NMS commitments to achieve full spectrum dominance (Figure 3).

Total Army Analysis and QDR 2001

In May 1997, the Department of Defense (DoD) conducted the first QDR. The second QDR (2001) process is ongoing. The Army's strategy is to use Total Army Analysis 2007 (TAA-07) and TAA-07.1 as the QDR baseline. TAA is an objective, doctrine-based process that establishes the total Army force structure to support the National Military Strategy as articulated in the Defense Planning Guidance. These requirements are matched against the current force and distributed across Army components. Unlike previous TAAs, TAA-07 was the first to employ a capabilities-based, threat-adaptive requirement (Mission Task Organized Forces (MTOF)), to clarify the Army's



Figure 3. Transformation Objective

force structure for both the operating force and generating force requirements. TAA-07.1 addressed the Army's Transformation initiatives and resourced three IBCTs. QDR 2001 will assess force structure requirements throughout the DoD. For the Army, this includes CINC day-to-day shaping and engagement requirements as well as Small Scale Contingencies (SSCs), including peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance. Additionally the requirements of Homeland Defense, Strategic Reserve, Domestic Support, Base Engagement Force, and Base Generating Force also affect Army force structure. None of these release the Army from the requirement to maintain the structure necessary to execute two near-simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTWs).

Operating Force Structure

The Army's operating force must be sufficient in both size and capabilities to meet all requirements implied in the NMS to provide the Nation with a full range of options that shape the international environment, as well as respond to CINC engagement activities. The operating force must be able to operate across the full spectrum of conflict and remain relevant to winning our Nation's wars—by being responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.

The operating force is the warfighting portion of the Army, the force that fights and wins the Nation's wars by providing the combat capability necessary to sustain land dominance. In addition to responding to a potential two-MTW scenario, the operating force conducts operations in support of CINC day-to-day requirements, Stability and Support Operations (SASO), and other non-MTW requirements.

The operating force accounts for approximately 795,000 "spaces" across all three Army components. A breakout follows:

AC – 303K
ARNG – 352K
USAR – 140K

Approximately 52,000 operating force requirements are unresourced and resident in Compo 4 (required but not resourced).

The Army has prioritized its force structure to accomplish the two-MTW scenario. Daily operations critical to the success of the overall Army mission simply did not have visibility in a once robust force structure environment. As the force structure picture has changed, visibility of routine tasks and their requirements for force structure have undergone critical examination. The Army has a number of studies underway that are expected to identify additional non-MTW related requirements and have potential impact on the end state of the operating force.

Rotating Rule Study. This study will determine the effect of rotation rules on force structure requirements. The base case analysis is complete and the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) is working on excursions, including all currently identified operational requirements.

CINC Shaping and Engagement Requirements. The Army will attempt to clearly identify all CINC day-to-day requirements. Additionally, it will identify the difference between TAA developed requirements and CINC requirements. The results will be applied to prioritization of requirements in the TAA process.

Army Support to Other Services (ASOS) and Executive Agent (EAR). The Army will identify force structure requirements associated with ASOS/EAR through direct input from Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) and CINCs.

High-Demand/Low-Density Units (HD/LD). The Global Military Force Policy identifies specific Army force structure organizations as HD/LD (biological detection companies, patriot battalions, civil affairs battalions and technical escort units). The current operating environment has placed significant stress on organizations categorized as HD/LD. The Army must ensure adequate resources are available to sustain ongoing operations for extended durations.

The Army is fully engaged in the daily shaping activities supporting the NMS, providing the majority of forces for joint operations. The CINCs routinely employ the Army as their force of choice and as a most effective tool in executing theater engagements. Maintaining our overseas presence and engagement activities promotes regional stability and gives substance to our security commitments. Additionally, the Army serves as a role model for militaries of emerging democracies and promotes internal stability and democratic growth for such nations. These requirements must be fully articulated for each Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) and included in the Army's force-sizing equation to ensure adequate forces are available to fulfill these critical requirements.

Generating Forces

Under Title X, the Army's Generating Force (primarily TDA units) has responsibility for providing the management, development, readiness, deployment and sustainment of the Operating Force (Figure 4). The size and capabilities of this Generating Force are based upon and, in some ways, dependent upon the size and capabilities of the supported Operating Force.

The effort to link the Generating Force structure to the Operating Force Structure was incorporated into the TAA-07 process. This effort captured the Title X functions and capabilities, as defined in Department of the Army (DA) PAM 100-1 pamphlet, across the Army's institutional base, industrial base and infrastructure, as represented by Headquarters, DA (HQDA), the MACOMs, field operating agencies, and staff support agencies. The Army's Generating Force consists of approximately 2,400 units and is comprised of the effective combination of military, DA civilian and contract personnel. These units are "linked" to the Operating Force through command and control (C2), logistical/administrative support, occupational skills, and geographic relationships.



Figure 4. Army Generating Force

The Generating Force, like the Operating Force, is resourced within programmed end strength. The current strength of the Generating Force is 209,000 military, 221,000 civilians, and 215,000 contractors. Since both forces must compete for the same resource pool, management of workforce mix (military, civilian, and contractor personnel) within the Generating Force is critical. Historically, the Generating Force has used approximately 20% of the military end strength across all three components (24% of AC; 10% of ARNG, and 30% of USAR). Beginning with TAA-07, the Army incorporated the Defense Reform Initiatives Directive (DRID) 20 and Federal Activities Initiative Reform (FAIR) Act to improve utilization of the workforce to ensure effective Title X support within manpower constraints.

Division XXI and Limited Conversion Division XXI

The Army strives to stay abreast of emerging technologies and implement them to gain efficiencies in both its operating and generating force structures. In the heavy divisions of our operating forces, significant change has occurred. This change is known as Division XXI.

Division XXI and its interim step, Limited Conversion Division, are FY99 force structure actions that began to lighten the Army's heavy forces. The objective is to optimize Force Structure by building on information dominance. It applies the concept of technology "enablers" that add capability to a combat system.

By FY01, these initiatives have already reduced requirements for many of the heavy system platforms in five of the six AC heavy division units, two of the ARNG heavy divisions, and eight ARNG heavy separate brigades. These initiatives not only lighten the Army's heavy forces (reducing the strategic lift requirements for affected divisions by 11%), but also provide systems for "cascading" across the force to improve its modernization posture. The actions embedded in the Army Vision will further guide how we transform the whole Army to a more responsive, flexible, and capable force.

Transformation Brigades

Recognizing the necessity to rapidly provide a full spectrum capable land force to operate in joint, combined, and multinational formations, the Army will transform its force structure to meet that requirement. The initial Transformation effort focuses on providing brigade-sized forces that will be more strategically deployable anywhere in the world to meet a variety of missions, ranging from humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping, and SSCs to MTWs (Figure 5). In addition to its strategic deployability, this force will be operationally deployable with every vehicle in the force capable of movement within a theater via C-130 aircraft.

This force will greatly enhance the Army's ability to be dominant at every point of the spectrum, combining technological overmatch with superior-quality leadership, people, and training to provide warfighting CINCs a land force capable of deterring, containing, stabilizing or decisively terminating a crisis.

Using a mix of available systems and IAVs, as they are acquired, two IBCTs are being formed at Fort Lewis, Washington, to serve as the initial transformation. These units will develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures required for optimization in SSCs and will also influence Objective Force development.



Figure 5. The IBCT

Force structure transformation will aggressively reduce the deployed logistics footprint and replenishment demand in theater, contributing to the improved deployability goal.

Medical Reengineering Initiative

The Medical Reengineering Initiative (MRI) is the Army Medical Command's EAD/EAC force redesign initiative that supports the Army's need for increased strategic responsiveness. This major Army initiative began with the inactivation of medical units in FY98. MRI conversion/activation began with nine units in FY00. One hundred sixty five of 391 MRI units (42%), including 70 units in support of the Counterattack Corps, will be converted/activated by FY06. These units are resourced through FY06, primarily through redistributing excess Class VII and Class VIII units, reprioritizing, cascading displaced equipment, and procuring new medical and nonmedical equipment. Two hundred twenty six MRI units (58%) are to be worked beyond FY06. MRI provides organizations that are easily tailored into capabilities-based packages that are capable of supporting the warfight from the corps, intermediate support base, or CONUS. MRI improves RC stationing and retention with smaller, modular organizations. MRI provides the infrastructure to support the Army digitization effort, insertion of telemedicine technologies, and other advanced medical and nonmedical information systems. MRI supports the Legacy Force while in transition to the Objective Force.

Institutional/TDA Redesign Axis (Generating Forces)

The Institutional or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organizations are the key component of the generating force for the Army's operating forces. The Army's specified Title X core competencies and processes form the basis of the generating force. Therefore, redesign of the Institutional/TDA force is an integral part of the overall Army Transformation strategy.

Institutional Army Reengineering. The following actions, as a minimum, are key to successfully achieving the Army's Transformation objective:

- Divest nonessential functions, remove unnecessary layering and duplication, consolidate functions, resource in the most cost-effective manner, and privatize/outsource functions where applicable.
- Transform Army Headquarters (corps through MACOM).
- Reallocate resources supporting core competencies; fully integrate those resources across the Army, other Services, and DoD.
- Reduce acquisition cycles by at least half, anticipating the needs of future organizations; complete major acquisitions within three budget cycles.
- Create and sustain a customer-focused learning organization that evaluates itself, eliminates obsolete structures, and designs better processes.

- Rapidly create and project an appropriate and capable force to any area of the world.
- Accomplish the reengineered generating force within the Army Vision.

At every level and in all organizations, soldiers and civilians must aggressively implement current initiatives, as well as generate new reforms, to produce efficiencies and, ultimately, savings for the Army. Through reinvestment and recapitalization, these savings will contribute greatly to the goals of providing modernized equipment to the force, reorganizing and preparing trained and ready units, and providing essential quality of life programs. Additionally, the nature of our future power projection Army will demand focused/precise logistics and improved command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). As called for in *JV 2020*, we will apply quality management principles and the best business practices available to develop and implement focused logistics.

Impacts on Force Structure

Reserve Component (RC)

The RC provides approximately 54% of the total Army strength. The Army force structure goal is to have all AC and RC elements interchangeable. Nevertheless, there are several force structure programs that highlight the Army's RC.

Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS)

As part of the Army's warfighting capability, the ARNG will continue to program 15 eSBs and two Special Forces Groups, as well as its divisional elements. In addition, the ARNG continues its execution of the ARNG Division Redesign Study (ADRS). This concept will convert up to 12 ARNG maneuver brigades and slice elements from two divisions to CS/CSS forces required to support the Army's warfighting requirements (Figure 6).

The ADRS converts approximately 48,000 of ARNG combat force structure to CS/CSS by FY09. The ARNG will convert six brigades to resource approximately 20,000 of CS/CSS between FY00-07. The majority of the structure to be resourced consists of transportation and quartermaster units. The ARNG will convert an additional 28,000 spaces (six brigades and slice elements from two divisions) by FY09. The division and brigade headquarters will be used to form a composite C2 headquarters for the CS/CSS structure. All conversions will be validated through the TAA process.

Approximately $2 billion is budgeted for FY00-FY07 to resource the ADRS plan. Additional resources will be applied in future funding plans to procure necessary resources by FY09 and complete the ADRS conversions by FY11.



Figure 6. ADRS Implementation

Multicomponent Units

The multicomponent initiative combines personnel from more than one component on a single authorization document. The intent of this initiative is to maximize the integration of AC and RC resources. The initiative does not change a unit's doctrinal requirement for personnel and equipment. No limit has been established for the number of units that may become multi-component and the concept is available to both AC and RC units. The ultimate decision for nominating a unit as multicomponent is based on mission requirements, unique component capabilities and limitations, readiness implications, efficiencies to be gained, and the ability and willingness of each component to contribute the necessary resources (Figure 7).

TAA-05 established two implementation phases to expand the multicomponent program. Phase One (FY98-00) established the plan to build authorization documents, establish initial units, and refine policy and procedures. Through observation and interaction with the affected units, proponents evaluated procedural options, issued procedural guidance to the field, and identified modifications needed to Army procedural systems.

The objective during Phase Two (FY01 and beyond) is to establish multi component as a routine part of the Army culture. Candidates will be identified during the biennial TAA process, command plan process, or as



Figure 7. Multicomponent Units

part of a major Army command initiative. As a result of TAA-07, over 100 units were nominated for multicomponent status. Nominated units include combat, CS and CSS units from the three Army components (Figure 8). Currently, there are 112 nominated and 21 existing multicomponent units in the Army.

Integrated Divisions

The Army established two AC/ARNG Integrated Divisions (IDs) in October 1999, each consisting of an AC headquarters, commanded by an AC Major General, and three ARNG eSBs. The IDs are designed for training readiness oversight for early deploying ARNG combat elements, to facilitate more rapid deployment of these brigades, and to enhance postmobilization preparation for war. The U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) leads the process with active participation from the Army staff, the National Guard Bureau, and the affected Adjutants General.

In December 1997, the Secretary of the Army approved establishing an integrated heavy division headquarters at Fort Riley, Kansas, with a forward element at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and an integrated light division headquarters at Fort Carson, Colorado (Figure 8). The eSBs selected for the heavy division are the 30th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (NC), the 48th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (GA), and the 218th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (SC). The light division eSBs include the 39th Infantry Brigade (AR), the 41st Infantry Brigade (OR), and the 45th Infantry Brigade (OK). In May 1999,



Figure 8. Integrated Division Headquarters and eSB Locations

the CSA named the AC/ARNG IDs: the 24th ID as the heavy division and the 7th ID as the light division. Both divisions were activated effective 1 October 1999.

The Army will continue to take full advantage of the soldiers, equipment, and resourcing of the AC and RC to field the most modern, lethal land combat force in the world.

Teaming/Corps Packaging

Introduced in the CSA's "One Team, One Fight, One Future" white paper, Army teaming pairs selected AC, ARNG, and USAR units for mutual support of operational requirements. The goal of teaming is to strengthen the Army's ability to respond across the full spectrum of military operations—from state/domestic to multinational/worldwide requirements—while maintaining a strategic reserve. Each component budgets their Teaming requirements through normal funding processes within their own appropriations. Requirements for FY01 are funded within existing resources. Out-year incremental funding requirements are programmed in the FY02-07 Plan.

Recently updated under a new concept called "corps packaging," all of the ARNG's eight combat divisions and 15 eSBs will be matched with AC divisions at the corps level. The CSA announced this expansion of teaming between AC and RC combat forces on 14 September 2000.

Based on the success of the recent teaming of the 1st Cavalry Division with the Texas National Guard's 49th Armored Division to train for Bosnia, the Army made the decision to expand the teaming concept.

Division teaming began two years ago as a pilot program, pairing the 49th with the 1st Cavalry Division headquartered at Fort Hood, Texas, and California's 40th mechanized

Infantry Division with the Army's 4th mechanized Infantry Division, also headquartered at Fort Hood. One division would have the lead in certain areas, and the divisions would share resources. When one division deployed, the other would mobilize to provide replacement operations.

The Army's 1st Cavalry Division required additional personnel in order to mobilize to Bosnia in 1998. Had the Army already begun a pilot program matching AC divisions to ARNG divisions, additional personnel could have come from the ARNG.

The latest announcement also expands last year's alignment of six ARNG enhanced brigades to the reactivated 24th Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas, and the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, as their primary combat forces.

The newly announced plan takes the program all the way with all the divisions and enhanced brigades of the ARNG included in the teaming concept.

Under I Corps at Fort Lewis, Washington, California's 40th Armored Division is teamed with the Army's 2nd Infantry Division in Korea, while the corps also includes three of the Guard's enhanced brigades: the 116th Armored Cavalry Brigade in Idaho, the 29th Infantry Brigade in Hawaii, and Washington's 81st Infantry Brigade.

Under III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, the 7th Infantry Division's headquarters at Fort Carson, Colorado, would align with the ARNG's 39th Infantry Brigade in Arkansas, the 41st Infantry Brigade in Oregon, the 45th Infantry Brigade in Oklahoma and the 155th Armored Brigade in Mississippi.

Also in III Corps the 49th Armored Division remains paired with the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood; Minnesota's 34th Infantry Division with the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood; and Indiana's 38th Infantry Division with Fort Carson, Colorado.

Kansas' 35th Infantry Division would fall under V Corps in Heidelberg, Germany along with Louisiana's 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) and Tennessee's 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

The XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, includes these relationships: the 29th Division with the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York; the 28th Division with the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia; and New York's 42nd Infantry Division with the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

The 24th Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas, which falls under the XVIII Airborne Corps, would be aligned with New York's 27th Infantry Brigade, North Carolina's 30th Infantry Brigade, Georgia's 48th Infantry Brigade, Florida's 53rd Infantry Brigade, Indiana's 76th Infantry Brigade and South Carolina's 218th Infantry Brigade.

Teaming is more than a training alignment. The ARNG is capable of augmenting, rotating, backfilling, and reinforcing the active force. Now all ARNG combat divisions and enhanced brigades are aligned to the Army's four corps (Figure 9).



Figure 9. Army National Guard Corps Alignment

Department of the Army Civilian Personnel

DA Civilians (DAC) are major contributors to the Army's overall mission, comprising approximately 16% of the workforce and occupying vital support positions in all Army operations. More importantly, civilians provide stability and institutional knowledge regardless of the organizational level to which they are assigned, from senior management to administrative support. This is particularly true in the area of depot level maintenance, supply, combat developments, acquisition, training, medical care, research and development, and facilities operations. The civilian work force is a cornerstone of the Army's CONUS-based, power projection strategy.

The overall tempo of Army operational deployments and mission requirements is ever increasing, yet the civilian work force continues to decline. The FY02-07 program reduces civilian end strength to 210,000 by FY07—a total reduction of 193,000 from FY89 to the end of FY07, or 48% since FY89. These reductions are related to CONUS-based outsourcing and privatization efficiencies in base support operations and the reshaping of Army Materiel Command (AMC). The final structure of the Army civilian workforce will be affected by the manning recommendations currently under review in support of the Transformation strategy initiatives. The impacts (additional savings or potential growth) will be assessed in concert with the results of the recent DRID 20/FAIR Act initiatives and programmed A-76 studies.

Conclusion

The Army must provide the Nation an array of deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable formations, which are affordable and capable of reversing the conditions of human suffering rapidly and resolving conflicts decisively. To do this, we must design organizational force structures that are interchangeable for different and changing full spectrum environments. We must also equip and train those organizations for effectiveness in any of the missions the Army is asked to perform.

The U.S. Army's force structure must rapidly evolve to best support the NMS and continue meeting the Army's Title 10 responsibilities, while posturing for the challenges of the next generation. The Army's Transformation strategy provides the means to achieve future success. Without the procurement of superior technology and modernized systems as force enablers, that success will be jeopardized. The Army's future force structure is predicated on a robust, fully funded modernization program to mitigate the risk to soldiers and mission.